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NEW APPROACHES TO SAFETY
ROBERT T. FRANCIS*
Introduction by Mr. Charles Tarpley: I could tell you a lot more about
Bob Francis, but that would detract from the time that he has consented
to spend with us. Without further comment, please an SMU Air Law
Symposium welcome for Robert T. Francis.
I thought I might talk a little bit about a subject that I guess a
few people probably will be interested in. That is TWA, and
maybe a little bit more personal reflection, and some public pol-
icy things, and then drift into some other things that I think are
related. I might say I was reading the outline of David Bernard
on the card in front of us here a few minutes ago. And he, as
you know, died in a Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) accident in
1978. That was very, very shortly after I joined the FAA. I was
doing congressional relations for the FAA at that point, and ob-
viously that was a big accident, a major congressional and public
issue. I am going to come back to the relevance of that again in
a couple of minutes. But, it is interesting to see how things tie
back around to you and you are not necessarily always aware of
that.
When we got up to East Moriches, on the morning after the
TWA crash, it was a madhouse. There were literally thousands
of people that were at that Coast Guard station and no one was
really in charge. Everyone was doing his thing, and everyone
was doing his thing very well. The Coast Guard was doing theirs;
the FBI had a role to play, the Suffolk County police, the New
York City police, the state medical people, everyone was involved
and being helpful, but there was a little bit of lack of direction, I
guess. And obviously, as the NTSB is in charge of this, that was
the first challenge.
* Vice Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board. This Speech is
adapted from Mr. Francis's presentation at the Journal of Air Law and Commerce's
Thirty-First Annual SMU Air Law Symposium on February 27-28, 1997.
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We had an organizational meeting that evening. It included
the people that you all know are parties to an investigation in
our system. This is really wonderful to be here by the way; I do
not have to explain the party system! So we had everyone in the
room at the Air National Guard Station and had the organiza-
tional meeting. This included some parties that are not nor-
mally there, including the FBI.
About 9:30 the next morning, I got a call from Jim Kallstrom,
who said, "Hey, you know, we have a problem with you guys; now
what are we going to do about this?" And let me just say thatJim
Kallstrom and I are very, very close friends, as a result of this.
The press has made a big deal about the problems between the
NTSB and the FBI. I would just say that for those of us who
worked in the field on both sides, underJim and with the NTSB
on the other side, this has not been a big problem. I will illus-
trate to you sort of a small problem that we had, but everyone
seems to think that we were steamrolled by the FBI, that we were
always bashing heads and this is just not true. I think that if one
looks at the relationship, one can always find folks that are in
organizations and in large part, those can be in the headquar-
ters of organizations who have their own parochial and not nec-
essarily terribly broad vision of the world, who generate
problems that the press like to talk about.
Anyway, to come back to that morning, Kallstrom said, "You
know, we've got to get together." Well we got together. It
turned out that one of the FBI guys who was supposed to be on
the structures group was supposed to have gone out on the boat
to the site at eight o'clock in the morning, but had missed the
boat. And the long and the short was, that when we found out
what had happened, it was a cultural and linguistic problem.
The FBI guy was on the structures group and when all of our
people-the traditional people that are parties-had decided
what they were doing, this guy did not really understand what
was going on and that he was supposed to be on the dock at
eight o'clock in the morning, so he was left behind. Well, the
FBI was sort of grumbling at us, and it turned out it was not
really anyone's fault; it was just one of those things that hap-
pened. We had to go back and sort of say to the people that
were involved with the investigation, "Make sure that when you
are talking in the organizational and the progress group meet-
ings, you are speaking English." Everybody has his acronyms,
everybody has his slang, everybody has his way in which he dis-
cusses these things. If you suddenly inject someone who is not
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from that community, you have to be careful that you are speak-
ing English to him. So that was our first, certainly not a major
crisis, and it was quickly resolved.
We then ended up with one in the other direction, where
NTSB and some of the parties were grumbling to me about the
fact that they could not take pictures of the wreckage as it was
being brought in. It is a traditional thing that we do as you all
know in an accident investigation, so we all talked about this.
Obviously the TWA accident was, and still is, potentially a crime.
And given that that is the case, there is a different level of deal-
ing with evidence and controlling evidence. So, I went to Kall-
strom and I said, "You know, we have this problem, our guys
need photographs." And basically he said, "How many?" So I
went back to our folks and to the parties, and said, "You know,
you can't take pictures yourselves, and you can't run down to
Snappy Photo and have them developed, and then bring them
back and use them in the traditional way that you do. It does
not meet the standard that the FBI has got to follow."
I said, "On the other hand, how many photographers do you
need? We will get them for you, we will have them surgically
attached, if you want, to you. They will take whatever pictures
you want, they will develop them, and they will give you
whatever you want, big, small, hundred, ten; whatever you
want." So these are the kinds of things that we went through
early, and I think that I would just say that as with all of this
enormous effort, that the spirit was always cooperative.
You talk about the wonderful, wonderful people from the
Navy and the Coast Guard, particularly the Navy divers, divers
from the City of New York. You know everyone was trying to do
his part and to do it well. And I think that when we look back at
the history of this at some point that it is going to be one of the
truly extraordinary things that we have been able to accomplish,
and not making judgment on where we are now, the fact that we
were able to recover ninety-whatever percent of that aircraft that
we have, and 216 out of 230 victims out of 130 feet of water in
the ocean is truly remarkable. I do not think there is another
country in the world or another organization or anything else,
who could even come close to doing this. And I think we should
all be proud of it.
Let me talk just briefly about the role of the NTSB and fami-
lies. I do not know where it started, but it certainly became an
issue after the Pan Am 103 accident. For us it was an issue with
Valujet. We all are extraordinarily blessed to have a gentleman
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named Peter Goelz who works for the NTSB who has a capability
of giving of himself that is remarkable. And he did this with
Valujet and he continued it with TWA. And partially as a result
of Peter's efforts, and partially as a result of what I consider to
be an abdication on the part of the industry, we have ended up
with executive direction and statutory direction to have a re-
sponsibility in this area. I would not have had it that way. I do
not think that that really should have been a federal govern-
ment function, but it is the kind of thing that happens when the
industry does not step up to the plate. And I think that there
would have been ways for the Air Transport Association of
America (ATA), or whoever it is, to have done this and to have
had teams that could have reacted in a responsible way and
avoided this problem. The thing that I am really talking about
here is responsibility in the day in which we live.
Let me come back to PSA and midair collisions. As you know,
there has been an enormous history of collision avoidance sys-
tems. But, we now have TCAS II, particularly, which is an enor-
mously effective anti-collision system. It is effective, not just for
that, but also for lots of other things that pilots and controllers
are finding that they can do with this system. It has not only
safety benefits, but it also has economic benefits as well.
There is a pilot right down the street here, who is a captain
for Southwest Airlines, and who did her Ph.D. thesis with Bob
Helmreich at the University of Texas. And she can talk about
what is happening in the air traffic control and piloting culture
with TCAS, and how its being used by pilots to bring economies
to their airlines. I have been involved over the last year with an
effort to get all cargo carriers to put TCAS in their large aircraft.
I think that there are lots of times when I felt like I was speaking
Swahili, because I did not get very far with them. Maybe if I
tried in French, in which I really am fluent, I could have done
something. But we did not get very far. They have been doing
some work in Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B), and I think a lot of us would agree that ADS-B some-
day is going to be a wonderful system. Nevertheless, it is not
right around the corner and it is not going to be bringing us
collision avoidance benefits in the next year or two years, or
probably even five years. It is going to be a long time.
I argued with the cargo industry that installing TCAS II is
something that makes enormous sense to do, and you are proba-
bly going to have to do it politically, because the idea that all
cargo carriers are taking delivery of brand new 767Fs from the
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Boeing Company without TCAS, to me, is outrageous. And the
idea that they are purchasing aircraft in the civil fleet in the
U.S., which are equipped with TCAS and are taking TCAS out, is
equally ridiculous. I did not get very far. I said to them, "Why
not come up with your own compliance schedule? You have
eight hundred aircraft or whatever it is." Come up and say, "We
are going to start taking our new aircraft with TCAS, and we are
going to keep the TCAS in the aircraft we are purchasing and
converting. We are going to have to, because the Asians and the
Europeans have jumped ahead of us on this now. They are go-
ing to require TCAS in all aircraft flying into their airspace." We
went to them many years ago and said, "You have to have TCAS
in your aircraft coming into our airspace: passenger aircraft,
heavy aircraft." Now they are coming back and saying, "Well,
this system is so great, it should be in cargo aircraft as well." So
they do not have the thirty seat exemption that the cargo guys
operate under. So you are going to have to comply if you are
going to Asia. You are going to have to comply if you are going
to Europe. You can take new aircraft, you cannot take it out of
old ones, and you can then come up with a schedule for C-
checks or however you want to do it.
I think that will be friendlier than if you require an FAA rule-
making process. And the United Parcel pilots have come in and
petitioned the FAA for rule-making on this. Well, the day
before yesterday, there was a Congressional hearing in Washing-
ton, and I testified about the installation of TCAS on cargo air-
craft and we will see what happens. But I think something is
going to come out of that, and I think, probably it is going to be
something that is less friendly than if they had voluntarily de-
cided to go ahead. We are in a political era where people want
smaller government, they want smaller budgets, they want fewer
bureaucrats, they want less paper. Well that is fine, and I am
very much in favor of that, but I do think, and I would cite the
case of the family responsibilities, and I would cite this case, as
an obligation on the part of those who are the "regulated" to
step forward some on this. You cannot just say that we are going
to get rid of all those things if somebody in the sector being
regulated is not willing to do his part and come halfway.
I had a meeting yesterday with Bob Crandall and Bob Baker
of American Airlines, and we talked about this. You know, Bob
Crandall was talking about some terrific stuff. He was saying
"We should do it, the government should not be spending all
this money. You know, we should get some guidelines and let us
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spend the money. Let the carriers do it." This is not exactly
what I expected to hear Bob Crandall saying, but I think that is
the way that we should be going. We have to be thinking if we
want to change this kind of equation; we have to be thinking
about how we do that.
I was going to talk a little about Flight Operations Quality As-
surance (FOQA) and partnership programs. I may be going on
a little bit too long here. I am certainly willing to take questions.
But I guess that I would say I am a great proponent of FOQA
and partnership programs, and I think that it is part of this same
sort of thing that I am talking about. You have to have better
communications between the various groups. You have to have
more volunteerism-you cannot just be sitting around waiting
for the FAA to hammer you. You have to have programs that
are trying to go upstream and look at what is happening in the
system, so that we are preventing accidents, and not using acci-
dent investigation as the way in which we are monitoring the
system. I think that there is a lot of change that must be made,
and I think a lot is being made. There are a lot of airlines that
are getting into FOQA and getting into partnership programs.
Particularly in this group, I would understand that there are is-
sues in terms of protection of data and everything else. But I do
not think that these things are impossible to resolve. I think
that people of goodwill can deal with these things. And I think
that is the way that we need to be going. There has to be more
working together and more trust. And I think there are exam-
ples where this is working and we can all continue to work on
that.
So, if there are some questions, I will answer them. As for the
probable cause on TWA, it might have to wait a few days.
Audience: Do you happen to know Tony Broderick had actually laid
down a gauntlet to the extent that he did yesterday. Would you be will-
ing to tell us what your response to that might be?
Mr. Francis: My response is that when Tony Broderick has an
idea, I always listen. Tony Broderick is one of the smartest peo-
ple I have ever know in my life, and I have known him for a long
time. So I think that openness is always desirable and I think it
is something we should be looking at.
Audience: With respect to TWA 800, can you discuss the sources of
ignition with respect to that circumstance?
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Mr. Francis: No. Obviously, that is what we are concerned
about finding. We have not found it. We are doing a lot of
work on that, however.
Audience: Sir, with respect to the Board's new mandate, the Family
Assistance Act, do you see any inherent conflict with the Board's other
statutory mandates to determine or project probable causes in this new
accident, the aircraft accident?
Mr. Francis: I do not see an inherent conflict. I think that it
is incumbent on us to be enormously careful about how we pro-
vide these two services, if you will, and to make sure that we do
not get them mixed together. It is not easy, but I think, you
know we have to do that.
Audience: In regards to TWA, in terms of fuel vent system that is
normally designed to operate in that tank, would the ignition source not
be a moot point, as they say in this audience, if the venting system had
been working?
Mr. Francis: I do not want to speculate on that. I do not
know quite frankly. I am not an engineer, and we are letting
engineers and people that really know their stuff talk about that.
I follow it, but not closely. As most of you know, when we have a
major accident, the folks that work on it are the staff of the
Board after the initial period. The initial period for the Board
member to be involved has lasted a long time for some obviously
unusual reasons in the TWA accident. One thing that I did
learn about dealing with the press is that there are two things
that you better be ready to do. One is to say that you do not
know the answer, and the other is to say that you are not going
to answer the question for whatever your reasons. Maybe I have
combined the two with you. But do not be deterred; I am not
shy to say it again.
Audience: Could you comment on the difference of perspective, if any,
you have experienced since switching from the FAA to NTSB?
Mr. Francis: Yes. I was not really in the regulatory part of
FAA, as many of you know. I was mostly involved in interna-
tional, and it was a lot of liaison and working with the Aviation
Matters Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), working with Eurocon-
trol, international airlines, etc. The NTSB has the luxury of be-
ing a more deliberative body and I like that. I mean, you really
for the most part have an ability to sit and think about things. It
is almost judicial and beyond just that which is very judicial.
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I think one of the things that one has to be careful with
Tony's recommendations is that we do not bring the NTSB too
close to doing things in exactly the same way that the FAA is
doing them. We are for openness. At the same time one of the
nice things about the Board is that we have a mandate to be
fairly aggressive. You can look at the NTSB's B-737 recommen-
dations, which I think at one point he described as highly ag-
gressive. That was at the point after the Board had made the
recommendations, but we do have that luxury, if you will, to
push the envelope a little bit and I think that is good. They in
turn have a different function and that is as the regulator to go
through the rule-making process, and then to come back to us
and say "yes," "no," "maybe," or "let's try here in between." So I
think we want to be careful that we do not disturb the institu-
tional balance, because I think the way that whoever set it up
initially, was a smart cookie.
Well, thank you very much. It has been a pleasure being here.
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